Direct naar de inhoud
⚡ Kritieke cyberalerts voor jouw sector & systemen — direct in je inbox. Aanmelden →
cybernieuws.nl Cybersecurity en informatiebeveiling nieuws alerts live · 10 min 128 bronnen 2 kritiek 1 vandaag
CVE's Videos Dagbriefing

← Terug naar CVE-database

CVE-2026-90221

NONE Gepubliceerd:

Beschrijving NL

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: nci: fix use of uninitialized memory in CORE_INIT_RSP parsing

nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v1() and nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v2() parse
the CORE_INIT_RSP packet without validating that the skb contains
enough data. A malformed response (e.g. injected via virtual_ncidev)
can declare a large num_supported_rf_interfaces while providing
insufficient data, causing reads of uninitialized slab memory. This
is later used in nci_init_complete_req(), triggering a KMSAN
uninit-value warning. Add skb length checks before accessing packet fields:
- Validate the skb has at least 1 byte for the status field. - Validate the skb can hold the fixed-size header before parsing. - In v2, bounds-check each variable-length rf_interface entry and its
extension parameters within the parsing loop. - In v1, verify the skb is large enough for both the variable-length
rf_interfaces array and the trailing rsp_2 structure.

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: nci: fix use of uninitialized memory in CORE_INIT_RSP parsing

nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v1() and nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v2() parse
the CORE_INIT_RSP packet without validating that the skb contains
enough data. A malformed response (e.g. injected via virtual_ncidev)
can declare a large num_supported_rf_interfaces while providing
insufficient data, causing reads of uninitialized slab memory. This
is later used in nci_init_complete_req(), triggering a KMSAN
uninit-value warning.

Add skb length checks before accessing packet fields:
- Validate the skb has at least 1 byte for the status field.
- Validate the skb can hold the fixed-size header before parsing.
- In v2, bounds-check each variable-length rf_interface entry and its
extension parameters within the parsing loop.
- In v1, verify the skb is large enough for both the variable-length
rf_interfaces array and the trailing rsp_2 structure.

References