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CVE-2026-92499

NONE Gepubliceerd:

Beschrijving NL

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent

A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when
ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509

Call Trace:

dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
__ ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an
adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir()
rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks
only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can
therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a
complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated
entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter
reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example:

block offset 0 4092 4096
|---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----|
de2.inode
| de2.rec_len
^ OOB, reported as UAF

de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in
the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded
directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata
checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory
entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and
the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block
tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an
offset exactly at the block boundary.

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent

A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when
ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509

Call Trace:

dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
__ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an
adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced.

ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir()
rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks
only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can
therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a
complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated
entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter
reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example:

block offset 0 4092 4096
|---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----|
de2.inode
| de2.rec_len
^ OOB, reported as UAF

de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in
the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary.

The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded
directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata
checksum tail is only 12 bytes.

Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory
entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and
the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block
tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an
offset exactly at the block boundary.

References