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CVE-2026-89674

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS Gepubliceerd:

Beschrijving NL

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix XDR length calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget

The XDR buffer size calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() has
multiple errors that can result in either an out-of-bounds write or
leaking uninitialized kernel memory to the client:

- fh_len doesn't account for XDR padding on the file handle data
- uid and gid lengths use "8 + len" but xdr_encode_opaque() actually
writes "4 + xdr_align_ size(len)" bytes
- ds_len omits the flags and stats_collect_hint fields (8 bytes),
while len's header constant overestimates by 8 bytes -- these
partially cancel but leave a net mismatch

The worst case occurs with short strings (e.g. uid=0, gid=0 with an
odd-sized file handle), where the function writes up to 5 bytes past
the reserved XDR buffer. Conversely, when string lengths happen to be
4-byte aligned, the reservation is too large and stale buffer content
is sent to the client. Fix this by breaking out every encoded field explicitly in the ds_len
calculation, using xdr_align_size() for all variable-length opaque
fields, and correcting the header constants.

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix XDR length calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget

The XDR buffer size calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() has
multiple errors that can result in either an out-of-bounds write or
leaking uninitialized kernel memory to the client:

- fh_len doesn't account for XDR padding on the file handle data
- uid and gid lengths use "8 + len" but xdr_encode_opaque() actually
writes "4 + xdr_align_size(len)" bytes
- ds_len omits the flags and stats_collect_hint fields (8 bytes),
while len's header constant overestimates by 8 bytes -- these
partially cancel but leave a net mismatch

The worst case occurs with short strings (e.g. uid=0, gid=0 with an
odd-sized file handle), where the function writes up to 5 bytes past
the reserved XDR buffer. Conversely, when string lengths happen to be
4-byte aligned, the reservation is too large and stale buffer content
is sent to the client.

Fix this by breaking out every encoded field explicitly in the ds_len
calculation, using xdr_align_size() for all variable-length opaque
fields, and correcting the header constants.

References