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CVE-2026-80781

NONE Gepubliceerd:

Beschrijving NL

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field()

hid_set_field() hands field->usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:

hid_dump_input(field->report->device, field->usage + offset, value);

if (offset >= field->report_count) {
hid_err(...);
return -1;
}

Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resol v_usage(usage->hid, NULL). The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field->maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object. Had the guard
run first, offset < report_count maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report->field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field. When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile. KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards. Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard. Because
field->maxusage >= field->report_count, the guard then establishes that
field->usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field()

hid_set_field() hands field->usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:

hid_dump_input(field->report->device, field->usage + offset, value);

if (offset >= field->report_count) {
hid_err(...);
return -1;
}

Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage->hid, NULL). The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field->maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object. Had the guard
run first, offset < report_count maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report->field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field. When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile. KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards.

Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard. Because
field->maxusage >= field->report_count, the guard then establishes that
field->usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee

References