CVE-2026-23316
Beschrijving NL
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix ARM64 alignment fault in multipath hash seed
`struct sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed` contains two u32 fields
(user_seed and mp_seed), making it an 8-byte structure with a 4-byte
alignment requirement. In `fib_multipath_hash_from_keys()`, the code evaluates the entire
struct atomically via `READ_ONCE()`:
mp_seed = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed).mp_seed;
While this silently works on GCC by falling back to unaligned regular
loads which the ARM64 kernel tolerates, it causes a fatal kernel panic
when compiled with Clang and LTO enabled. Commit e35123d83ee3 ("arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire
when CONFIG_LTO=y") strengthens `READ_ONCE()` to use Load-Acquire
instructions (`ldar` / `ldapr`) to prevent compiler reordering bugs
under Clang LTO. Since the macro evaluates the full 8-byte struct,
Clang emits a 64-bit `ldar` instruction. ARM64 architecture strictly
requires `ldar` to be naturally aligned, thus executing it on a 4-byte
aligned address triggers a strict Alignment Fault (FSC = 0x21). Fix the read side by moving the `READ_ONCE()` directly to the `u32`
member, which emits a safe 32-bit `ldar Wn`. Furthermore, Eric Dumazet pointed out that `WRITE_ONCE()` on the entire
struct in `proc_fib_multipath_hash_set_seed()` is also flawed. Analysis
shows that Clang splits this 8-byte write into two separate 32-bit
`str` instructions. While this avoids an alignment fault, it destroys
atomicity and exposes a tear-write vulnerability. Fix this by
explicitly splitting the write into two 32-bit `WRITE_ONCE()`
operations. Finally, add the missing `READ_ONCE()` when reading `user_seed` in
`proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed()` to ensure proper pairing and
concurrency safety.
Origineel (Engels) tonen
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix ARM64 alignment fault in multipath hash seed
`struct sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed` contains two u32 fields
(user_seed and mp_seed), making it an 8-byte structure with a 4-byte
alignment requirement.
In `fib_multipath_hash_from_keys()`, the code evaluates the entire
struct atomically via `READ_ONCE()`:
mp_seed = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed).mp_seed;
While this silently works on GCC by falling back to unaligned regular
loads which the ARM64 kernel tolerates, it causes a fatal kernel panic
when compiled with Clang and LTO enabled.
Commit e35123d83ee3 ("arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire
when CONFIG_LTO=y") strengthens `READ_ONCE()` to use Load-Acquire
instructions (`ldar` / `ldapr`) to prevent compiler reordering bugs
under Clang LTO. Since the macro evaluates the full 8-byte struct,
Clang emits a 64-bit `ldar` instruction. ARM64 architecture strictly
requires `ldar` to be naturally aligned, thus executing it on a 4-byte
aligned address triggers a strict Alignment Fault (FSC = 0x21).
Fix the read side by moving the `READ_ONCE()` directly to the `u32`
member, which emits a safe 32-bit `ldar Wn`.
Furthermore, Eric Dumazet pointed out that `WRITE_ONCE()` on the entire
struct in `proc_fib_multipath_hash_set_seed()` is also flawed. Analysis
shows that Clang splits this 8-byte write into two separate 32-bit
`str` instructions. While this avoids an alignment fault, it destroys
atomicity and exposes a tear-write vulnerability. Fix this by
explicitly splitting the write into two 32-bit `WRITE_ONCE()`
operations.
Finally, add the missing `READ_ONCE()` when reading `user_seed` in
`proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed()` to ensure proper pairing and
concurrency safety.