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CVE-2026-102713

NONE Gepubliceerd: CWE-125

Beschrijving NL

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than

four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not

against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one

missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none. The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:

```c

/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */

status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,

server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);

... fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),

packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);

```

`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the

end of the first packet:

```

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow

READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5

#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_me mory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78

0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region

```

Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them

back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel. The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs

ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the

attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never

returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and

the server thread suspended, and no later client is served. Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,

and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.

References