Direct naar de inhoud
⚡ Kritieke cyberalerts voor jouw sector & systemen — direct in je inbox. Aanmelden →
CVE's Videos Dagbriefing

← Terug naar CVE-database

CVE-2026-97437

HIGH · 7.1 CVSS Gepubliceerd:

Beschrijving NL

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:

if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))

This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size

T he correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):

sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size

Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size

The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path. A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size
but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary. Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.

Origineel (Engels) tonen

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:

if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))

This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size

The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):

sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size

Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size

The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.

A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size
but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.

Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.

References